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INTRODUCTION
The
World
Trade
Organization’s
(“WTO”)
recent Appellate Body decision in the Antigua—
United States dispute involved a claim by
Antigua and Barbuda (“Antigua”) that U.S.
federal and state anti-gambling regulations
violated U.S. obligations under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).1 The
U.S. federal laws in question, the Wire Act,
the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act (“IGBA”),2 allegedly make it
1. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, ¶ 374, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005)
(requesting that the United States bring its measures,
found in this Report and in the Panel Report to be
inconsistent with the GATS, into conformity with its
obligations under GATS); see General Agreement on Trade
in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
2. Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000) (penalizing
“betting or wagering” businesses that facilitate “bets
or wagers on sporting events or contests” over the
Internet); Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000)
(defining “unlawful activity” as including any business
enterprise involving gambling in violation of the laws
of the United States or the particular state in which
they are committed); Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1955 (2000) (defining “illegal gambling

FINAL FINAL

2006]

9/28/2006 12:16:26 PM

GAMBLING

ON THE

FUTURE

OF

GATS

103

unlawful for suppliers located outside the
United States to “remotely” supply gambling
and betting services to consumers within the
United States.3 Regulating Internet gambling4
within Antigua is particularly important to
the United States because a substantial
portion of offshore Internet gambling sites in
the nearby Caribbean and Central America are
located in Antigua.5 By 1999, there were over

business” as a business that violates “the law of a
State or political subdivision, . . . involves five or
more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise,
direct, or own all or part of such business, and has
been or remains in substantially continuous operation
for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross
revenue of $2,000 in any single day”).
3. See generally Panel Report, United States—Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, ¶ 3.227, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004)
(defining remote supply of gambling and betting
services as including situations in which the gambling
service supplier, whether foreign or domestic, and the
service consumer are not physically in one place).
4. Internet gambling is defined as “any activity that
takes place via the Internet and that includes placing
a bet or wager.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO03-89, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE 1 n.1
(2002). Wagers and bets, under the typical definition
put forward by courts, include “a prize, consideration,
and chance.” Id.
5. See Joseph M. Kelly, Internet Gambling Law, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 117, 128 (2000); see also John D.
Andrle, Note, A Winning Hand: A Proposal for an
International Regulatory Schema with Respect to the
Growing Online Gambling Dilemma in the United States,
37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1389, 1409 (2004) (explaining
that the 1994 Antigua and Barbuda Free Trade and
Processing Zone Area Act established a commission to
create a tax-free zone for a number of industries,
including gambling, which caused gambling to become a
major industry in the area).
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In November 2004, the WTO Panel ruled in
favor of Antigua.7 This decision would have
required the United States to allow offshore
casinos to accept U.S. wagers over the
Internet. However, on April 7, 2005, the WTO
Appellate Body partially reversed the Panel’s
decision.8 Both the Panel and the Appellate
Body found the U.S. ban to be a restriction on
trade in services under GATS;9 but unlike the
Panel, the Appellate Body found that, with the
exception of the potentially discriminating
Interstate Horseracing Act (“IHA”),10 the ban
was “necessary to protect public morals or
maintain public order.”11

6. See First Written Submission of Antigua and
Barbuda, United States—Measures Affecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 7,
WT/DS285
(Oct.
8,
2003),
available
at
http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/
business_politics/pdf/Antigua_FirstSubmission_Executive
Summary.pdf (adding that the revenue generated from
these activities in 1999 accounted for over ten percent
of the nation’s gross domestic product that year); see
also Jeffrey Sparshott, WTO Lets U.S. Limit Internet
Gambling, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at C8 (noting the
importance of internet gambling revenue as a supplement
to Antigua’s tourist business).
7. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶¶ 7.2, 7.5.
8. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 373.
9. Id.; Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 7.2(b); see
also Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Softens Earlier Condemnation
of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling, but Confirms Broad
Reach Into Sensitive Domestic Regulation, AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L.
INSIGHT,
Apr.
12,
2005,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/04/insights050412.htm
l (noting that domestic regulation banning the remote
supply of gambling services constitutes a “per se
prohibited market access restriction” because it has
the effect of keeping out “cross-border supplies of
gambling services”).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (2000) (stating that an
interstate off-track wager cab be accepted by an offtrack betting system).
11. Appellate
Body
Report,
supra
note
1,
¶
373(D)(vi)(a).
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This Comment explores whether the Appellate
Body, in finding that the U.S. restrictions on
gambling qualified for an exception under
Article XIV of the GATS, adequately balanced
international free trade rules with the U.S.
desire
to
continue
to
enforce
federal
restrictions relating to Internet gambling.12
Part I explains the relevant provisions of
GATS Article XIV, particularly XIV(a) and the
chapeau, and the general exceptions to Article
XIV. Part I also examines the WTO Antigua—
United States Panel Report and provides
background on previous WTO cases that applied
and interpreted Article XX of the 1994 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), which
is similar in language and applicability to
Article XIV of GATS. Part II argues that the
Appellate Body erred when it concluded that
the U.S. gambling restrictions are necessary
to protect public morals or maintain public
order. Particularly, Part II argues that the
Appellate Body failed to adhere to previous
WTO
measures
dealing
with
similar
jurisprudence
and
both
panels
did
not
12. Compare Chad Hills, Citizen Link, Focus on Social
Issues: Gambling in the U.S., The National Gambling
Impact Study Commission (NGISC) Report (Nov. 26, 2003),
http://www.family.org/cforum/fosi/gambling/gitus/a00289
77.cfm (providing support for the U.S. interest in
prohibiting gambling by explaining that "the NGISC
report clearly states that gambling addiction is
increasing in the United States as gambling expands"),
with James D. Thayer, The Trade of Cross-Border
Gambling and Betting: The WTO Dispute Between Antigua
and the United States, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Nov. 5, 2004,
¶¶
19-20,
http://www.law.duke.edu/
journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2004DLTR0013.pdf
(arguing
that the U.S. moral exception claim is attenuated
because of the vast extent of gambling among U.S.
citizens and the accepted practice of gambling in
various form throughout all fifty states).
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adequately
explain
the
significance
of
footnote 5 in GATS Article XIV. Finally, Part
III
recommends
that
the
WTO
explicitly
recognize and more stringently enforce its
practice of treating prior Panel and Appellate
Body decisions as binding; the parties to GATS
clarify the language in Article XIV; and that
States parties create their own Internet
gambling regulations to account for the unique
jurisdictional
issues
surrounding
the
Internet.

I. BACKGROUND
The WTO resulted from the Uruguay Round that
took place between 1986 and 1994.13 Principle
among the WTO’s functions are supervising the
administration
of
multilateral
trade
agreements, serving as a forum for trade
negotiations,
cooperating
with
other
international
institutions
to
facilitate
cohesive policymaking, and facilitating trade
dispute resolution.14

13. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the
WTO: The Basics, What is the World Trade Organization?,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/fact1_e.htm
(last
visited
May
3,
2006)
[hereinafter
Understanding
the
WTO]
(comparing
documents negotiated by the WTO to contracts, which
bind governments to keep their trade policies within
agreed limits); see also World Trade Organization, The
WTO
in
Brief:
Part
3,
The
WTO
Agreements,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/
inbr03_e.htm (last visited May 3, 2006) [hereinafter
the WTO Agreements] (stating that from 1947 to 1994,
GATT was the forum for negotiating trade agreements and
since the establishment of the WTO, GATT has become the
WTO’s umbrella agreement for trade in goods).
14. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, art. III, Legal Instruments—Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1145 (1994) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement]; see also John O. McGinnis & Mark L.
Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 511, 530-31 (2000) (opining that the WTO’s dispute
resolution system is its most important function).
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The GATT is the WTO’s principal authority
for trade in goods.15 Through the GATT, WTO
Members operate a non-discriminatory trading
system
that
defines
their
rights
and
obligations.16 The GATS, on the other hand, was
created to provide a similar system of
international trade rules for the services
sector.17 The GATS distinguishes between four
modes
of
supplying
services:
consumption
abroad,
commercial
presence,
presence
of
natural persons, and cross-border supply,
which is the mode of service relevant in the
United States—Antigua dispute.18

A. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION—GATS 1995
The Uruguay Round resulted in the creation
of the GATS, mainly because services are the
largest and most active component of both
developed and developing countries.19 GATS
requires each Member to have a schedule of
specific
commitments
that
identifies
the
15. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 14, Annex 1A
[hereinafter GATT].
16. See The WTO Agreements, supra note 13 (noting that
each Member of the WTO receives guarantees that its
exports are fairly and consistently treated within
other countries’ markets).
17. GATS, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 1.
18. See World Trade Organization, Services: GATS, The
General
Agreement
on
Trade
in
Services
(GATS):
Objectives,
Coverage
and
Disciplines,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm
(last
visited
May
3,
2006)
[hereinafter
GATS:
Objectives, Coverage and Disciplines] (defining crossborder supply "to cover services flows from the
territory of one Member into the territory of another
Member").
19. See id. (stating that services "account for over
60 percent of global production and employment").
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services for which the Member guarantees
market access, therefore binding the Member to
that specified level.20 The Member undertakes
not to impose any new measures that would
restrict
entry
into
the
market
or
the
21
operation of a service.
This gambling dispute is the first occasion
in which a WTO Member raised an argument under
Article XIV, which provides for general
exceptions to the GATS.22 Therefore, the Panel
is unable to use prior GATS jurisprudence as a
Even
if
there
were
guiding
framework.23
previous decisions interpreting Article XIV,
stare decisis does not apply to the WTO.24
However, previous decisions remain persuasive
and may have a binding nature.25

20. See generally GATS, supra note 1.
21. See World Trade Organization, Services: Schedules,
Guide to Reading the GATS Schedule of Specific
Commitments
and
the
List
of
Article
II
(MFN)
Exemptions,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm
(last visited May 3, 2006) (explaining that specific
commitments "are a guarantee to economic operators in
other countries that the condition of entry and
operation in the market will not be changed to their
disadvantage").
22. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.447; see also
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 291 n.351
(noting that the United States—Antigua dispute is also
the first instance defining public morals and public
order).
GATS
Article
XIV
lists
several
general
exceptions, preceded by the caveat that all members
must
agree
not
to
apply
an
exception
in
a
discriminatory manner, in order to avoid a “disguised
restriction on trade in services.” GATS, supra note 1,
art. XIV.
23. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.447.
24. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at
the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political
Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 254 (2004).
25. See id. (arguing that the Appellate Body does
seems to observe de facto stare decisis, but the WTO
Agreement
expressly
places
exclusive
interpretory
powers with the Ministerial Conference and General
Council).
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Similar to the GATT, the objectives of the
GATS are grounded in trade liberalization and
the desire to foster a mutually advantageous
trading framework among countries.26 Despite
the GATS goal of promoting free trade, Article
XIV contains general exceptions to the GATS.27
If a measure is found inconsistent with one
of a party’s substantive obligations under the
GATS, the measure is subjected to a two-tiered
analysis to determine if it is justifiable
under Article XIV.28 First, the WTO panel must
determine whether the measure falls within one
of the provisions of Article XIV.29 The
analysis requires “a sufficient nexus between
the measure and the interest protected.”30 The
required nexus is generally specified within
the language of the provision31 and, in this

26. GATS, supra note 1, pmbl. (making specific
reference to the need to account for the particular
needs of developing countries, including their need to
regulate the internal supply of services).
27. Id. art. XIV; see also id. art. XVbis (providing
additional
exceptions
specifically
related
to
security).
28. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products,
¶
118,
WT/DS58/AB/R
(Oct.
12,
1998)
[hereinafter Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp]
(recounting the two-tier process announced by the
appellate body in the United States—Gasoline case).
29. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 292
(determining
that
Members
can
pursue
objectives
identified in the provisions of Article XIV, even if
Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in
other provisions of the agreements, provided that the
objectives satisfy all necessary conditions of Article
XIV).
30. Id.
31. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 16-17,
WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate
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case, because the United States defended its
measure under Article XIV(a), the WTO dispute
resolution bodies examined whether the measure
is “necessary” to protect public morals or to
maintain public order.32 Additionally, footnote
5 of Article XIV(a) requires that “[t]he
public order exception may be invoked only
where a genuine and sufficiently serious
threat is posed to one of the fundamental
interests of society.”33 The term “order,” when
read together with footnote 5, refers to the
preservation
of
society’s
fundamental
interests, which includes standards of law,
security and morality.34 Under the second tier
of the analysis, the measure must meet the
requirements of the introductory provisions—
chapeau—of Article XIV, where the WTO panel
then must determine whether the measures are
applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary
or unjust discrimination.35
Body, United States—Gasoline] (noting that the general
rule in treaty interpretation is that terms should be
interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning,
giving consideration to the context of the terms, in
light of the purposes and objects of the treaty).
32. See, e.g., Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6.4656.487 (noting that the term ‘public morals’ “denotes
standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or
on behalf of a community or nation” and that the
legislative history of the U.S. laws in question
indicate the protection of fundamental interests, such
as minimizing fraud and underage gambling).
33. GATS, supra note 1, art. XIV n.5. In International
Legal Materials, this appears as footnote 12.
34. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6.467-6.469
(explaining the intention of the drafters of the GATS,
in regards to footnote 5). Although “public order” and
“public morals” are two distinct concepts, there is
overlap because they protect similar values.
35. Id. art. XIV; see also Vicente Paolo B. Yu, III,
Technical Comments on the WTO’s “GATS—Fact and Fiction”
Paper, http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/ foei.html (last
visited May 3, 2006) (arguing that the language
expressed in the introductory clause of Article XIV
creates an additional barrier to the adoption and
enforcement of measures that violate a country’s GATS
commitments). If the disputed measures do not meet the
requirements
of
the
chapeau,
it
is
considered
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B. PREVIOUS WTO DECISIONS ANALYZING
ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT
Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV of
the GATS are similar in context and purpose.36
Therefore, the WTO dispute resolution bodies
consider prior jurisprudence addressing GATT
Article
XX
as
relevant
and
useful
in
interpreting GATS Article XIV.37 The relevant
interpretation of “necessary” under previous
Article XX decisions entails an evaluation of
whether the measure is likely to achieve the
stated policy objective of protecting against
identified risks and whether there is a strong
connection between the interests the measure
protects and the necessity of the measure.38

inconsistent with the GATS. Id. A likely result is that
the non-complying country must alter its measure or
suffer retributions such as paying compensation or
suffering retaliatory sanctions. Id.
36. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 291
(noting that both permit country deviations in the
pursuit of specified policy objectives); see also World
Trade Org., Environment Backgrounder: Relevant GATT/WTO
Provisions, GATT 1994—Article XX on General Exceptions,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
envir_e/envir_backgrnd_e/c7s3_e.htm (last visited May
3, 2005) (noting that in applying Article XX, the
purpose of the WTO-inconsistent measure must aim either
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and
additionally, the disputed measure must meet the
requirements of the necessity test).
37. See Appellate Body Report, supra note, ¶ 291
(affirming the Panel’s use of GATT jurisprudence).
38. See generally Christoph T. Fedderson, Focusing on
Substantive Law in International Economic Relations:
The
Public
Morals
of
GATT’s
Article
XX(A)
and
“Conventional” Rules of Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 75, 95 (1998) (reviewing divergent opinions on
whether
GATT
Article
XX
deserves
a
narrow
interpretation and noting that "the rule of strict
construction is flexible enough to achieve either a
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The “necessity test” involves balancing
three factors: “(1) the degree to which the
common interests or values that the measure
protects are vital and important, (2) whether
alternative
measures
are
‘reasonably
available’ to accomplish the stated objective,
and (3) whether alternative measures are
inconsistent
with
the
Member’s
WTO
obligations.”39 To adequately apply Article XIV
to the United State—Antigua dispute, the
Appellate
Body
had
previous
WTO
interpretations of Article XX of the GATT for
guidance, particularly its decisions in United
States—Gasoline, United States—Shrimp, and
Korea—Beef.
1. United States—Standards for Reformulated
and
Conventional Gasoline
The United States Congress amended the Clean
Air Act in 1990, which, through subsequent
regulations, permitted domestic refiners to
establish an individual baseline representing
the quality of their 1990 gasoline before
forcing them to use the EPA’s statutory
baseline.40 The disparity in the Clean Air Act
narrow or broad interpretation of the Exceptions
Clause”).
39. See Tatjana Eres, Note, The Limits of GATT Article
XX: A Back Door for Human Rights?, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L.
597, 625 (2004) (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea—
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef, ¶¶ 162-66, WT/DS161 (Dec. 11, 2000) (arguing that
the validity of the original measure is particularly
relevant under the second aspect, which examines
whether
any
alternative
measures
are
"reasonably
available").
40. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (stating that the amendments
purported to ensure that the level of air pollution
caused by gasoline combustion did not exceed 1990
levels,
thus
reducing
the
pollutants
in
major
metropolitan areas); see also Appellate Body, United
States—Gasoline, supra note 31, at 21 (noting the
Panel’s finding that imported and domestic gasoline
were
“like
products,”
but
under
the
baseline
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was that foreign refiners were not afforded
the same permission in establishing their
baselines,
which
induced
complaints
from
foreign countries, including Venezuela and
Brazil.41
The Panel found that the United States
failed to meet the “necessity test” under
Article XX because there was no direct
connection between less favorable treatment of
imported gasoline and the U.S. objective of
improving its air quality.42 Conversely, the
Appellate Body found the Panel erred by ruling
that the baseline establishment rules did not
constitute
a
measure
“relating
to”
the
conservation of clean air within the meaning
of Article XX, and consequently failed in its
analysis to further examine the chapeau, or
introductory clause, of Article XX.43
The Appellate Body determined that the Clean
Air Act did not meet the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XX.44 The U.S. failure to
establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule, imported
gasoline did not benefit from as favorable sales
conditions as domestic gasoline).
41. See Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra
note 31, at 6.
42. Panel
Report,
United
States—Standards
for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan.
29, 1996).
43. Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra note
31, at 28; see also Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading
of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction
on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
739, 758 (2001) (arguing that the Appellate Body
formulated a more sophisticated analysis of Article XX
and "shifted its attention, for the first time in any
such proceeding, to the conditions placed on the use of
a measure in the chapeau to Article XX").
44. Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra note
31, at 27; see also Gaines, supra note 43, at 759

FINAL FINAL

9/28/2006 12:16:26 PM

explore other means, including cooperative
arrangements, and its disregard of the costs
for foreign refiners from the imposition of
baselines,
constituted
“unjustifiable
discrimination” and a “disguised restriction
on international trade.”45
2. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand
brought the United States—Shrimp case to the
WTO,
disputing
Section
609
of
a
1990
appropriations
bill
amending
the
U.S.
Endangered Species Act.46 Section 609 states
that in order to export shrimp into the United
States, countries must obtain certification
showing that they equipped their vessels with
turtle-excluder devices.47
(finding that the Appellate Body did not need to
establish an elaborate interpretation of “arbitrary or
unjustifiable
discrimination”
because
the
U.S.
regulations facially discriminated between domestic and
foreign refiners).
45. Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra note
31, at 27.
46. See Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, at 1;
see also International Trade Data System, Import
Restrictions
Under
Environmental
Laws,
http://www.itds.treas.gov/EnvImp.htm (last visited May
3, 2006) (noting that the Endangered Species Act of
1973 protects animal and plant species currently in
danger of extinction and those that may become
endangered
in
the
future);
Dukgeun
Ahn,
Note,
Environmental Disputes in the GATT/WTO: Before and
After US—Shrimp Case, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 819, 836
(1999) (stating that the most significant risk to the
species of sea turtles was the incidental capture and
drowning of the sea turtles by shrimp trawlers).
47. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act §
609, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 101 Stat. 988, 1037-38
(1990); see also Ahn, supra note 46, at 838 (recounting
that in 1996, the U.S. embargo on shrimp was being
enforced on "shrimp or products from shrimp harvested
in the wild by citizens or vessels of nations which
have not been certified", even though some of the boats
may have been equipped with turtle excluder devices).
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The Appellate Body examined the chapeau and
considered whether the application of the
measure would constitute a means of “arbitrary
or
unjustifiable
discrimination
between
countries where the same conditions prevail”
or a “disguised restriction on international
trade.”48 The Appellate Body found that the
Panel did not examine Article XX’s ordinary
meaning,49 disregarding that the application of
the
Article’s
introductory
clauses
is
essential to the analysis.50
The Appellate Body found that Section 609
constituted both unjustifiable and arbitrary
discrimination
because
the
United
States
required all importing countries to adopt a
comprehensive regulatory program that was
essentially the same as the U.S. program,
without
inquiring
if
the
program
was
appropriate
for
the
conditions
in
the
51
Additionally, the U.S.
exporting countries.
48. United States—Shrimp, supra note 28, ¶¶ 98, 113
(presenting the issues of the case and an introduction
to Article XX of the GATT).
49. Id. ¶ 115 (finding that the Panel did not look
into the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article
XX).
50. See Yasmin Moorman, Note, Integration of ILO Core
Rights Labor Standards into the WTO, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 555, 571 (2001). The standards of the
chapeau are both substantive and procedural because a
facially neutral measure, applicable in an arbitrary or
unjustifiable manner, is considered discriminatory.
Id.; see also Timothy M. Reif & Julie Eckert, Courage
You Can’t Understand: How to Achieve the Right Balance
Between Shaping and Policing Commerce in Disputes
Before the World Trade Organization, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 657, 694 (2004).
51. United States—Shrimp, supra note 28, ¶¶ 161, 17677. But cf. Chris Wold & Glenn Fullilove, International
Environmental
Law
Project,
Analysis
of
the
WTO
Appellate Body’s Decision in Shrimp/Turtle (Feb. 24,
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failure to reach an international agreement
with
the
complaining
WTO
Members
was
“unjustifiable discrimination” because the
United States completed an agreement with
Latin American countries.52
3. Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef
Australia and the United States brought the
Korea—Beef case to the WTO, disputing Korean
measures that affected the importation of beef
products.53 Specifically, they contested the
separate retail distribution channels (“dual
retail system”) that existed for imported and
domestic
beef
products,
which
allegedly
benefited domestically-supplied beef.54 Korea
raised an argument under Article XX, claiming
that even if the Appellate Body disagreed with
Korea’s claim that the dual retail system was
consistent with the GATT, the system was
justifiable.55
2000),
http://www.lclark.
edu/org/ielp/turtlebriefing.html
(arguing
that
even
though applying the same rules to both foreign and U.S.
shrimpers may be inequitable, it is not discriminatory
because "discrimination" is treating all products
differently).
52. Cf. id. (arguing that conditions may differ in
some countries, so the Appellate Body should not infer
that the successful negotiation of an international
treaty with Latin America should result in a successful
treaty with the Asian countries).
53. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting
Imports
of
Fresh,
Chilled,
and
Frozen
Beef,
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Appellate
Body, Korea—Beef].
54. Id. ¶¶ 35-41, 50-60. The dual retail system for
beef included “the obligation for department stores and
supermarkets authorized to sell imported beef to hold a
separate display, and the obligation for foreign beef
shops to bear a sign with the words ‘Specialized
Imported Beef Store.’” Id. ¶ 5.
55. Id. ¶ 23 (arguing that Korea’s regulatory goal of
eliminating deceptive retail practices justified the
dual retail system).
Korea’s goal was not merely the
“reduction
or
limitation”
of
deceptive
retail
practices, but their “elimination.” Id.
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Applying Article XX, the Appellate Body
noted that the reach of the word “necessary”
is not limited to that which is “indispensable
or an absolute physical necessity,” although
measures which fall under those categories
would certainly fulfill the requirements of
Article XX.56 There are varying degrees of
necessity, such as the less stringent standard
of “making a contribution to.”57 In Korea—Beef,
the Appellate Body set a stricter standard of
necessity, one that is located closer to the
side
of
“indispensable,”
not
the
less
stringent “making a contribution to.”58
The Appellate Body articulated a balancing
test for making a determination as to whether
a measure is “necessary” under Article XX.
That test includes “the contribution made by
compliance with the measure to the enforcement
of the law or regulation at issue, the
importance of the common interests or values
protected by that law or regulation, and the
accompanying impact of the law or regulation
on imports or exports.”59 The Panel found that
Korea did not apply a dual retail system for
other products in which fraudulent sales

56. Id. ¶ 160 (noting that a standard law dictionary
definition of “necessary” highlights its distinctive
contextual meanings).
57. Id. See generally Alan O. Sykes, The Least
Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 405 (2003)
(arguing that necessity or least restrictive means
tests embody the WTO’s commitments to lower trade
barriers).
58. See Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶
161.
59. Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 164.
The Appellate Body noted that a measure is more likely
to be considered “necessary” when its impact on
imported products is minimal. Id. ¶ 163.
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previously occurred. This indicated that the
dual retail system was not “necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Agreement” under Article XX.61
60

The Panel stated that Korea’s burden was
showing
that
no
alternative
measures
consistent
with
the
WTO
agreement
were
reasonably available or that an alternative
measure
was
technically
or
financially
burdensome.62 The Appellate Body therefore made
clear that a Member must first explore and
exhaust all GATT/WTO compatible alternatives
before
resorting
to
WTO-inconsistent
measures.63

C. UNITED STATES—ANTIGUA CASE HISTORY
This dispute began in March 2003, when
Antigua requested formal consultations with
the United States and the WTO concerning the
U.S. ban on cross-border gambling and betting
60. See Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports
of
Fresh,
Chilled
and
Frozen
Beef,
¶¶
660-64,
WT/DS161/R (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Panel Report,
Korea—Beef; see also Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra
note 52, ¶ 153 (finding that Korea used "traditional
enforcement
measures"
such
as
"record-keeping,
investigations, policing, and fines," rather than a
dual
retail
system,
for
related
products
where
fraudulent misrepresentation occurred).
61. Panel Report, Korea—Beef, supra note 59, ¶ 665;
see also Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 52, ¶
153 (noting that Korea had the burden of demonstrating
to the satisfaction of the Panel that alternative
measures consistent with the WTO Agreement were not
reasonably available).
62. Panel Report, Korea—Beef, supra note 59, ¶ 665;
cf. Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 153
(noting
Korea’s
contention
that
ex
post
facto
investigations
do
not
guarantee
the
level
of
enforcement that Korea has chosen and with respect to
policing, that option is not reasonably available
because Korea lacks the resources to police thousands
of shops on a round-the-clock basis).
63. Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶¶ 18082.
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services.64 Consultations between the parties
failed to resolve the dispute, and upon
request by Antigua, the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (“DSB”) established a panel to resolve
the matter.65
Antigua claimed that U.S. laws prohibiting
the cross-border supply of gambling services
are inconsistent with provisions of the GATS.66
Antigua argued that the United States violated
market access provisions, set out in its
schedule of commitments, by barring the supply
of gambling services on a cross-border basis.67
Specifically, the U.S. GATS Schedule makes “a
full commitment for the cross-border supply of
services
classified
under
subsector
10.D
‘Other
recreational
services
(except
sporting).’”68
The United States justified its restrictions
on Internet gambling as an exception from its
GATS commitments based on Article XIV(a),
which states that the GATS agreement shall not
64. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda,
United
States—Measures
Affecting
the
Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/1
(Mar. 27, 2003).
65. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 1.2.
66. Id.; see also Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Condemnation of
U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling Pits Free Trade Against
Moral Values, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHT, Nov. 2004,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2004/11/insight041117.html
(stating that Antigua’s argument relied on whether in
the
GATS,
the
United
States
made
international
commitments to gambling services, particularly arguing
that the United States agreed to not enact restrictions
on “recreational services”).
67. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 3.30.
68. Id. ¶¶ 3.30-3.31 (noting that the United States
did not adequately explain why gambling and betting
services should be excluded in light of the wording of
its schedule of commitments).
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prevent governments from adopting or enforcing
measures deemed “necessary” to protect public
morals or maintain public order.69 As the party
seeking to invoke Article XIV, the United
States had the burden of proof in support of
its assertion that the challenged measures
satisfy the requirements of Article XIV.70 In
defense of perceived GATS violations, the
United States argued that its measures are
exempt under Articles XIV(a) and XIV(c); the
application of these exceptions are consistent
with the chapeau of Article XIV.71
The United States argued that the remote
supply of gambling and betting services raised
significant
concerns
relating
to
the
maintenance of public order and the protection
of public morals under Article XIV(a).72
Specifically, the United States identified two
primary issues of concern. Internet gambling
provides increased opportunities for minors to
gamble; gambling within the United States is
not permissible for minors.73 Age verification
69. Id. ¶¶ 6.443-6.446; see also Jeremy Hutto, What Is
Everybody Else Doing About It? A Foreign Jurisdictional
Analysis of Internet Gaming Regulation, 9 GAMING L. REV.
26, 33 (2005) (stating that the main U.S. argument for
regulating Internet gambling is "to protect children
and prevent financial crimes"). Following the Panel
Report, the Bush Administration announced that it will
adamantly contest the Panel’s decision. Id.
70. See
Panel
Report,
supra
note
3,
¶
6.450
(recounting the burden of proof test articulated by the
Appellate Body in Unites States—Wool Shirts and
Blouses).
71. Id. ¶ 6.443.
72. Id. ¶ 6.444; cf. John Warren Kindt & Stephen W.
Joy, Internet Gambling and the Destabilization of
National and International Economies: Time for a
Comprehensive Ban on Gambling Over the World Wide Web,
80 DENV. U. L. REV. 111, 111 (2002) (arguing that
"social, financial, and political costs," including
"the creation of new gambling addicts, bankruptcies,
and crime," was directly caused by "the widespread
proliferation and accessibility of gambling sites on
the Internet").
73. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.444.
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is a specific concern because operators of
gambling
websites
cannot
look
at
their
customers to assess their age or request photo
identification.74
Additionally,
internet
gambling can also be used to “launder the
proceeds of organized crime.”75 The remote
supply of gambling is more dangerous than the
non-remote supply of such services because of
the
amount
of
money
and
manipulability
76
inherent in Internet gambling.
Further, the
United States argued that it did not apply its
laws in a discriminatory manner; domestic
suppliers of remote gambling services also
fall within the purview of the laws in
question
and
are
equally
subject
to
77
enforcement actions.
74. Cf. IGamingNews.com, New Research Shows that
Minors Have Easy Access to Online Gambling Services
(July
27,
2004),
http://www.igamingnews.
com/index.cfm?page=artlisting&tid=5250
(discussing
a
study that tested thirty-seven online gambling sites
"to see if a minor could set up an account"). The study
found that "the minor was able to open up an account
and access gambling systems on thirty of the sites."
Id.
75. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.444. The United
States argued that internet gambling is, in general,
more susceptible to criminal endeavors and activities.
Id. ¶ 6.457. In its submission to the Appellate Body,
Antigua argued that the Panel impermissibly advocated
several other factors associated with internet gambling
that would support the U.S. action under Article XIV,
including fraud and public health. Appellate Body
Report, supra note 1, ¶ 278.
76. But see I. Nelson Rose, The Legalization and
Control of Casino Gambling, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 26799 (1980) (arguing that one of the factors contributing
to the influence of organized crime is the need for
investment capital; the migration to online gambling
may diminish the importance of organized crime because
there is less capital required to build online casinos,
compared to conventional casinos).
77. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.586 (reviewing
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Since the United States is a major consumer
of (domestic) state sanctioned gambling and
betting services, Antigua questioned why a
prohibition on the remote supply of gambling
is necessary to protect public morals.78 In
regards to the requirements of the chapeau,
Antigua
argued
that
the
U.S.
measures’
discriminatory motive is shown by a lack of
enforcement against domestic suppliers of
remote gambling services.79
In its report, the Panel examined whether
the purpose of the disputed measures was to
protect public morals and to maintain public
order. The Panel defined “public morals” as
“standards
of
right
and
wrong
conduct
maintained by a community or nation;” “public
order” concerns “the preservation of the
fundamental interests of a society.”80 The
Panel found that in addition to protecting
against underage gambling and organized crime,
congressional reports related to the Wire Act,
Travel Act, and IGBA demonstrated that the
laws were also established to minimize fraud,
money laundering, and health concerns stemming
from pathological gambling.81 The Panel further
determined that footnote 5 of Article XIV was
met because the United States presented
evidence that organized crime posed specific
threats, which was enough to satisfy the
statistics provided by the U.S. Department of Justice
that point to ninety prosecutions of domestic remote
suppliers between 1992 and 2002).
78. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.444.
79. Id. ¶ 6.585 (contrasting the lack of enforcement
against U.S. suppliers with a case in which the United
States prosecuted and convicted an Antiguan internet
sportsbook service).
80. Id. ¶¶ 6.465-6.467; see Appellate Body Report,
supra note 1, ¶ 296 (referring to "Congressional
reports and testimony" that the adopted measures
addressed concerns "pertaining to money laundering,
organized
crime,
fraud,
underage
gambling
and
pathological gambling").
81. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.486.
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footnote’s high standard.82 Accordingly, these
measures fell within the purview of GATS
Article XIV(a) in terms of the measures’
designed purpose.83 However, since the United
States failed to consult with Antigua before
imposing the restrictive measures, the Panel
determined that the important reasons for
imposing restrictions that could render the
measures necessary do not outweigh the U.S.
failure to consult with Antigua on other
available alternatives.84
Despite the Panel’s necessity ruling, it
further proceeded to determine if the measures
were applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory
way—whether
the
application
violated
the
85
chapeau. In its findings, the Panel concluded
that the United States did not demonstrate
that it applied the disputed laws, the IHA in
particular, in a non-discriminatory manner
between
domestic
and
foreign-service
suppliers.86
On appeal, the Appellate Body affirmed the
Panel’s Article XIV(a) conclusions that the
U.S. measures were “designed” to protect
public order; the requirements of footnote 5
were
also
met.87
The
contours
of
the
82. Id. ¶ 3.279.
83. Id. ¶ 6.487.
84. Id. ¶¶ 6.532-6.534 (noting the U.S. obligation to
pursue WTO-consistent alternatives in good faith,
regardless of the possible U.S. belief that such
negotiations would not be fruitful).
85. Id. ¶¶ 6.569-6.608.
86. Id. ¶ 6.607 (concluding that the United States had
failed to meet its evidentiary burden). The Panel
specifically mentioned the “ambiguity” surrounding the
Internet Horseracing Act. Id.
87. Appellate Body, supra note 1, ¶ 298 (noting that
the Panel’s lack of numerous explicit references to
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“necessity” test were then reviewed. The
Appellate
Body
noted
that
while
the
evidentiary burden lies on the United States,
it does not have the impractical burden of
identifying the universe of less restrictive
reasonable alternatives to the measures in
question.88
As
an
unwarranted
procedural
hurdle, the Appellate Body refuted the Panel’s
requirement
that
a
measure’s
“necessity”
requires consultation; rather, necessity is
based on an objective assessment of reasonable
alternatives.89 All of the other factors
expressed by the Panel weighed in favor of
necessity—e.g.,
“very
important
societal
interests” warranting strict controls, and the
three statutes in question “contribute to the
realization of the ends that they pursue”—so
the Appellate Body determined that the U.S.
measures did, in fact, satisfy the necessity
test.90
Having reversed the Panel’s conclusions on
necessity, the Appellate Body went on to
consider whether the U.S. measures were
discriminatory
under
the
chapeau.
The
Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel’s
finding that the United States enforced its
gambling laws more strictly against foreigners
than against domestic suppliers,91 but the
Appellate Body deemed that the Panel was
footnote 5 did not mean that its requirements were not
considered by the Panel).
88. Id. ¶¶ 309-10 (indicating that a responding party
is merely obligated to make a prime facie showing of
necessity).
89. Id. ¶¶ 316-17.
90. Id. ¶¶ 322-27 (adding that the restrictive trade
impact of the U.S. measures was tempered by "the
specific concerns associated with remote gambling,"
such as the specific problems of anonymity on the
internet).
91. Id. ¶¶ 355-56 (arguing that the Panel erred by
basing its conclusions on enforcement actions in five
cases because contextual considerations mandate an
assessment of the overall patterns of enforcement).
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partially correct when it determined that the
IHA is potentially discriminatory.92 Because of
the textual similarities between Article XX of
the GATT and Article XIV of the GATS, the
Appellate Body acknowledged that its previous
interpretations of Article XX are applicable
in analyzing Article XIV.93

II. ANALYSIS
The function of the Panel is to make “an
objective assessment of the matter before
it.”94 The Appellate Body determined that with
respect to Article XIV of the GATS, the Panel
did not fail to make an objective assessment
of the facts.95 The Appellate Body therefore
erroneously reversed key aspects of the
92. Id. ¶ 361 (accepting Antigua’s argument that the
Interstate Horseracing Act, "on its face, authorizes
domestic service suppliers, but not foreign service
suppliers, to offer remote betting services in relation
to certain horse races").
93. Id. ¶ 291 (finding that the language in both
Article XIV of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT are
similar, notably the use of the word “necessary,” as
well as the requirements set out in the respective
chapeaus); see also Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare
Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a
Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 917-18 (1999)
(distinguishing between “formal bindingness” and “not
formally binding, but having force” as a difference
between
“authoritative”
and
“persuasive”
forces
characterized by degree).
94. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay
Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (1994).
95. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 373
(finding that the Panel did not fail to meet its
requirements under Article 11 of the DSU, but reversed
the Panel’s findings regarding paragraph (a) and the
chapeau).
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Panel’s findings. The Appellate Body’s finding
that the United States’ restrictions on
Internet gambling qualified for an exception
under Article XIV of the GATS, which reversed
the Panel’s decision, also did not adhere to
previous WTO decisions interpreting Article XX
of the GATT.96
Following
the
two-tiered
analysis,
the
Appellate Body erred both when it determined
that the United States’ Internet gambling
restrictions fell within one of the paragraphs
of Article XIV and when it determined that the
measure satisfied the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XIV.97 The Appellate Body
also failed to comply with its obligation to
adequately uphold the free trade objectives of
the GATS.98

A. THE APPELLATE BODY FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
APPLY THE NECESSITY TEST

96. See Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto
Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a
Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (1999) (arguing
that precedent guides the WTO because of "the custom or
habit of the tribunal, the tribunal’s sense of justice
(particularly to treat likecases alike), the tribunal’s
need for efficiency," and the tribunal’s desire to make
decisions that are consistent with the expectations of
all parties).
97. See World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical
Index: General Agreement on Trade in Services, General
Agreement
on
Trade
in
Services,
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_inde
x_e/gats_02_e.htm#fnt39 (last visited May 3, 2006)
(noting that because Article XIV constitutes an
exception provision, it should be narrowly interpreted
and its scope cannot be expanded to cover other
regulatory objectives than those listed).
98. See Anup Shah, Free Trade and Globalization, The
WTO
And
Free
Trade,
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/WTO.
asp?p=1 (last updated Dec. 27, 2001) (criticizing the
WTO for its inability to promote cooperation between
rich
and
developing
countries,
with
regards
to
international trade).
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The Appellate Body erred when it found that
these measures are “necessary.”99 The purpose
of this requirement under Article XIV(a), that
a measure be necessary or that there is no
reasonably
available
WTO-consistent
alternative, reflects the shared understanding
that Members should not deviate from their
substantive GATS obligations unless there is
an absolute need.100 Because previous WTO
decisions in United States—Gasoline, United
States—Shrimp, and Korea—Beef demonstrated a
recent trend towards a stricter interpretation
of the term “necessary,” the Appellate Body
should have applied a stricter standard for
necessity in its analysis.101
Like the Panel in Korea—Beef, which found
the dual retail system is a disproportionate
measure not necessary to secure compliance
with Korean law against deceptive practices,
99. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 304
(noting that the "standard of 'necessity' provided for
in the general exceptions provision is an objective
standard"); see also Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra
note 53, ¶ 22 (finding in other instances where
fraudulent sales occurred, Korea did not apply a dual
retail system, which was evidence that the dual retail
system was not necessary to secure compliance with laws
or regulations).
100. See John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World
Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in
the Dispute Settlement System, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1173,
1182-83
(1999)
(arguing
that
consistently
adjudicating litigants’ claims is the objective "if the
WTO
dispute
system
is
to
achieve
and
maintain
legitimacy under international law").
101. See generally Steve Charnovitz, An Analysis of
Pascal Lamy’s Proposal on Collective Preferences, 8 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 449, 469 (2005) (arguing that when the WTO
uses the weighing and balancing technique to evaluate
“necessity,” it needs to weigh the societal benefits of
the measure with the potential "damage of the measure
to the multilateral negotiating framework”).
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the Appellate Body should have found that the
U.S.
trade-restrictive
measures
against
Internet gambling were not necessary to invoke
a public order exception.102 The Appellate Body
in this case did not examine other less traderestrictive measures that the United States
could have taken.103 Rather than implementing
the trade-restrictive Wire Act, Travel Act,
and the IGBA, the United States could have
entered into negotiations with Antigua in
order to find other reasonable laternatives to
prevent or reduce the alleged harm associated
with the remote supply of gambling.104
1. The Appellate Body Erroneously Shifted the
Burden of
Proof Away from the United States
In determining necessity, the Appellate Body
failed to adequately balance a series of
factors. One factor is the extent to which the
measure contributes to the realization of the
goal pursued.105 In this case, the United
States argued that the implementation of
Internet gambling regulations was necessary to
maintain public order and/or to protect public

102. See Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶
163 (finding that alternative, WTO-consistent measures
were reasonably available to Korea to meet its
enforcement level; therefore Korea could not justify
the dual retail system as necessary under Article XX).
103. See discussion supra Part I.B.3 (arguing that a
Member must first explore and exhaust all GATT/WTO
compatible
alternatives
before
resorting
to
WTOinconsistent measures).
104. See
generally
Amelia
Porges,
Settling
WTO
Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 141, 142 (2003) (arguing that
negotiation should be used to settle disputes between
parties and that the failure to reach early settlements
in disputes particularly harms developing countries).
105. See Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶
163 (noting that a measure is likely considered
necessary if it greatly contributes to the pursued
goal).
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morals.106 Although the Panel confirmed that
the United States had certain concerns that
were specific to the remote supply of gambling
and betting services, it did not analyze the
extent to which the Wire Act, the Travel Act,
and the IGBA are necessary in contributing to
the realization of the goal pursued.107
The Panel in Korea—Beef established that
because
Korea
had
a
measure
that
was
inconsistent with the GATT, it had the burden
of showing that there were no WTO-consistent
measures reasonably available.108 The United
States—Antigua
Panel
correctly
looked
to
Korea—Beef and determined that a key element
of the application of the “necessity” test of
Article XIV is whether the United States
explored and exhausted reasonably available
WTO-consistent measures.109 The Appellate Body
106. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.521 (arguing that
because the U.S. concerns are "specific to the remote
supply of gambling and betting services," measures
enacted to alleviate those concerns relating to the
"non-remote supply of gambling and betting services
cannot be compared and examined as WTO-consistent
alternatives").
107. See id. ¶ 6.522 (noting there were other WTO
consistent alternatives because Antigua argued that "it
has in place a regulatory regime that is sufficient to
address the specific concerns identified by the United
States with respect to the remote supply of gambling
services"). Antigua’s regulations include "requirements
for
identity
verification,
fraud
prevention
and
gambling addiction," and Antiguan law that specifically
prohibits underage gambling by Antiguan law. Id.
108. Panel Report, Korea—Beef, supra note 59, ¶ 665;
see also discussion supra Part I.B.3 (emphasizing that
a Member must explore and exhaust all GATT/WTO
compatible
alternatives
before
resorting
to
WTOinconsistent measures).
109. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.531 (determining
that in "rejecting Antigua’s invitation to engage in
bilateral
or
multilateral
consultations
and/or
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erred when it reversed the Panel’s decision on
the basis that the Panel did not focus on a
specific
alternative
measure
that
was
reasonably available to the United States.110
Specifically, the Appellate Body stated that
the Panel’s “necessity” analysis was flawed
because “it did not focus on an alternative
measure that was reasonably available to the
United
States.”111
In
making
that
determination, the Appellate Body deviated
from previous WTO decisions, such as Korea—
Beef, where the burden was on Korea to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Panel
that alternative measures consistent with the
WTO agreement were not reasonably available.112
Based on prior jurisprudence, the Appellate
Body in the United States—Antigua dispute
wrongfully shifted the burden of finding
reasonable alternative measures away from the
United States.113

negotiations, the United States failed to pursue in
good faith a course of action" that may have resulted
in determining "a reasonably available WTO-consistent
alternative").
110. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 317
(arguing that consultations with Antigua "was not an
appropriate alternative for the Panel to consider
because consultations are a process, the results of
which are uncertain").
111. Id.
112. See discussion supra Part I.B.3 (noting that the
Member enacting WTO-inconsistent regulations has the
burden of showing that it explored other means).
113. See Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, How Can the United
States
Correct
Multi-National
Corporations’
Environmental Abuses Committed in the Name of Trade?,
15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 65 (2004) (arguing that
the WTO’s determination of which party has the burden
of proof shows "the WTO’s pro-trade bias" because the
country enacting trade restrictive measures has the
burden of justifying those measures). The number of
disputes resolved by the WTO DSB addressing objections
under Article XX of the GATT indicates that the
challenging party often has the advantage. Id.

FINAL FINAL

2006]

9/28/2006 12:16:26 PM

GAMBLING

ON THE

FUTURE

OF

GATS

131

2. The Appellate Body Failed to Address the
Restrictive Trade Impact of the United States’
Measures
Another factor in the necessity test is the
extent to which complying with the measures
produces restrictive effects on international
commerce.114 Antigua argued that the U.S.
federal restrictions on Internet gambling,
when read together with the relevant state
laws, have the effect of total prohibition,
which is the most trade-restrictive approach
possible.115 The United States defended its
regulations by arguing that a Member has the
right to heavily restrict a highly risky
service, by allowing the use of a less risky
service, which in this case is gambling by
non-remote means.116 Although the United States
may have a valid interest in maintaining
public order or protecting public morals, it
chose to do so in the most trade-restrictive
means
possible,
rather
than
finding

114. See Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶
163 (explaining that a "measure with a slight impact on
imported products might be more easily considered as
necessary, compared to a measure with intense or
broader restrictive effects"); see also Appellate Body,
United States—Shrimp, supra note 28, ¶ 138 (stating
that if Article XX allowed Members to adopt any measure
conditioning access to its market, "market access could
become subject to an increasing number of conflicting
policy requirements for the same product", thus leading
to "the end of the WTO multilateral trading system").
115. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 309
(arguing that it would be an impossible burden if the
WTO required a responding party to identify all less
restrictive alternative measures and to "show that none
of those measures achieve the desired objective").
116. See id. ¶ 95.
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methods

of

accomplishing

its

Although the Panel agreed that the Wire Act,
the
Travel
Act,
and
the
IGBA
have
a
significantly restrictive trade impact, its
analysis revealed that it did not place much
weight on the restrictive trade impact of the
three
federal
statutes.118
Further,
the
Appellate Body did not completely address this
aspect of the Panel’s Report, so neither the
Panel nor the Appellate Body gave this factor
enough weight in the necessity test when
analyzing the restrictive effects of the
disputed measures on international commerce.119

B. THE PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS FOOTNOTE 5 OF GATS ARTICLE XIV
In their analyses, both the Panel and the
Appellate Body did not adequately address a
relevant component of Article XIV, namely
footnote 5, and therefore did not examine the
entire textual context.120 The Panel mentioned
footnote 5 once in its analysis,121 and that
117. See Sykes, supra note 57, at 415-16 (noting that
other factors used in a least-restrictive means test
used in previous GATT cases include "the effect of
alternative policies on trade, the administrative
difficulties
and
resource
costs
associated
with
alternative policies, and the regulatory efficacy of
those polices").
118. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.521 (determining
that the United States had legitimate concerns specific
to the remote supply of gambling, which it found
suggested
that
the
measures
in
question
were
necessary).
119. Cf. Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶
158.
120. Cf. J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV.
275,
281-82
(1989)
(remarking
on
the
potential
importance of a footnote by highlighting the well known
“footnote 4” from Carolene Products).
121. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 3.279 (finding
that the specific threats posed by organized crime,
which stems from the remote supply of gambling, meet
the high standard of footnote 5).
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conclusion was approved by the Appellate
Body.122 A footnote is an important part of the
text and has as binding a force and effect as
the text itself.123 Footnote 5 of Article XIV
sets a high standard in terms of when an
exception to the GATS should be invoked,
determining that “[t]he public order exception
may be invoked only where a genuine and
sufficiently serious threat” to a fundamental
interest of society.124
Footnote 5 sets a higher standard because it
is a two-step analysis, whereby the Appellate
Body should first determine if the disputed
measures satisfy Article XIV(a) and then
continue its analysis to determine if the
measures satisfy the requirements of the
footnote.125 Additionally, it is significant
that although Article XIV of the GATS and
Article XX of the GATT are similar in language
and purpose, GATT Article XX does not contain
anything equivalent to footnote 5, indicating
that the drafters intended to set a higher

122. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 298-99
(noting that the Panel referred to footnote 5 in a
manner that understood the requirements for the public
order exception). Because the Panel defined public
order and analyzed the facts of the case under that
definition, "the Panel was not required to make a
separate, explicit evaluation that the standard of
footnote 5 had been met." Id.
123. Cf. Robert A. James, Are Footnotes in Opinions
Given Full Precedential Effect?, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 267
(1999) (arguing that the location of significant
language, whether in the text or a footnote, is a
matter of style which should be left up to the writer
of an opinion).
124. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 297.
125. See Debra P. Steger & Peter Van Den Bossche, WTO
Dispute Settlement: Emerging Practice and Procedure, 92
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 79, 85 (1998).
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standard for invoking an exception under the
GATS.126
Because the United States presented evidence
that the remote supply of gambling raised
significant moral concerns, both the Panel and
the Appellate Body were likely justified in
determining
that
such
concerns
regarding
organized crime, underage gambling, money
laundering, fraud, and public health satisfied
Article XIV(a).127 Even if the United States
had a justifiable argument that its measures
satisfied Article XIV(a), neither the Panel
nor
the
Appellate
Body’s
analysis
distinguished
between
the
evidentiary
requirements of Article XIV(a) and footnote 5,
which seems to set a higher evidentiary
burden.
After determining that the United States
satisfied its burden of proving that the
measures are designed to protect public morals
or maintain public order based on the Article
itself, the Panel should not have stopped its
analysis
and,
consequently,
failed
in
determining
whether
the
U.S.
concerns
satisfied footnote 5. Further, the Appellate
Body’s analysis was incomplete when it simply
determined that the Panel was not required to
make a separate, explicit determination that
met the standard of footnote 5.128
The language of footnote 5 states that the
footnote applies only to public order because
the footnote does not mention public morals.

126. Compare GATT, supra note 15, with GATS, supra note
1.
127. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.a (providing an
overview of the United States’ argument that it has
specific concerns of public order and morals with the
remote supply of gambling).
128. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 298
(finding that although the Panel Report did not discuss
footnote 5 in depth, this alone does not establish that
the Panel failed to determine if the statutes satisfied
the footnote’s criteria).
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Although the Panel determined that “public
morals” and “public order” are two distinct
concepts, it also stated that there is
significant overlap between these two terms,
in effect treating the terms synonymously.129
The Appellate Body did not evaluate the
significance of this distinction, in light of
the wording of footnote 5, making it difficult
for future parties to determine the type of
evidence or the strength of evidence required
to
satisfy
the
higher
standard
of
the
footnote.
The Appellate Body should have determined
that the Panel erred by failing to apply
Article XIV(a) in its entirety, constituting a
failure to “make an objective assessment of
the facts.”130 The language of footnote 5
plainly states that invoking the public order
exception is acceptable only when there is a
sufficient or serious threat, so the Appellate
Body should have required that the Panel have
a stricter standard in defining public order
or, at the very least, explain how the
129. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 3.279 (explaining
that organized crime posed threats such as "social
exploitation;
corruption
and
subversion
of
the
democratic processes; economic losses and instability;
and diminution of the domestic security and general
welfare of the United States and its people," which
satisfied the public order exception in footnote 5).
Further, both “public morals” and “public order” aim to
protect many similar values, so there may be some
overlap. Id. ¶ 6.468
130. See Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO
Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 635, 656 (2003)
(noting that a Panel should take the Member’s argument
into account, but ultimately, the Panel must act in
accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation, as
stated in the Vienna Convention); see also Appellate
Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, ¶ 141, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999).
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distinctive language of the footnote played
into the analysis beyond the mere mention of
public morals and public order in the opinion.

C. UNITED STATES INTERNET GAMBLING RESTRICTIONS ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH THE CHAPEAU OF ARTICLE XIV
In the second step of the exceptions
analysis, the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and
the IGBA must meet the requirements of the
chapeau, which is the introductory clause of
the provision.131 An analysis of the chapeau
reveals that it requires that the measures in
question are not applied in a manner that
would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where like conditions prevail, or serve as a
disguised restriction on trade in services.132
Based on the reasoning used in previous
decisions applying the chapeau of Article XX
of the GATT, the Appellate Body in the United
States-Antigua
dispute
erred
when
it
determined that the U.S. Internet gambling
restrictions
satisfied
the
requirements
imposed by the opening clauses of Article XIV.
The Appellate Body failed to adhere to
reasoning used in previous WTO decisions when
it determined that the U.S. Internet gambling
regulations did not constitute arbitrary or
unjustifiable
discrimination.133
Similar
to
131. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 339
(stating that the focus of the chapeau “is on the
application of a measure already found by the Panel to
be inconsistent with a GATS obligation,” but a chapeau
analysis is performed because the measure falls within
one of the paragraphs of Article XIV).
132. See id. (arguing that “the chapeau serves to
ensure that Members’ rights to avail themselves of
exceptions are exercised reasonably, so as not to
frustrate the rights accorded other Members by the
substantive rules of the GATS”).
133. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.537 (noting
that the chapeau of Article XIV is textually similar to
the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, so the Panel
referred to "such jurisprudence to the extent to which
it is applicable and relevant" in interpreting and
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United States—Gasoline, where the WTO found
that the disputed measures failed to meet the
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT because the
United States did not engage in cooperative
agreements, thus demonstrating unjustifiable
discrimination, the Appellate Body should have
concluded that the U.S. failure to negotiate
with
Antigua
amounted
to
unjustifiable
discrimination.134
Another
example
from
Appellate Body jurisprudence that highlights
the United States—Antigua Appellate Body’s
mistake comes from United States—Shrimp. In
that case, the Appellate Body emphasized the
importance of making a serious good faith
effort to avoid a finding of unjustifiable or
arbitrary discrimination. The United States
demonstrated
good
faith
through
its
willingness to try and partake in negotiating
an agreement to avoid the trade restriction,
even
though
the
negotiation
was
not
successful.135 Based on the previous Appellate
Body decisions in United States—Gasoline and
United States—Shrimp, engaging in a good faith
attempt at negotiations appears to be a
requirement for satisfying the chapeau.136
applying the chapeau to Article XIV in the United
States—Antigua dispute).
134. See Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra
note 31, at 25 (elaborating that the kinds of analysis
"pertinent in deciding whether the application of a
particular
measure
amounts
to
'arbitrary
or
unjustifiable discrimination', may also be taken into
account in determining the presence of a 'disguised
restriction' on international trade").
135. Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note
28.
136. See Kuei-Jung Ni, Redefinition and Elaboration of
an Obligation to Pursue International Negotiations for
Solving Global Environmental Problems in Light of the
WTO
Shrimp/Turtle
Compliance
Adjudication
Between
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In United States—Gasoline, the United States
disregarded the additional costs for foreign
refiners, and similarly, in the United States—
Antigua dispute, the United States may have
minimized
the
economic
impact
that
its
regulations have on Antiguan-based gambling
companies.137 The resulting discrimination was
foreseeable by the United States because it
knew that Antigua’s economy depended largely
on its gambling industry, so the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, and the IGBA would have a great
economic impact.138 The United States may have
a
strong
argument
for
imposing
traderestrictive and economically damaging measures
if its goal was truly to eliminate the remote
supply of gambling as a means of protecting
the public morality of American society, but
laws such as the IHA undermine that goal
because they reveal arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.139

Malaysia and the United States, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
111, 134-36 (2004) (citing United States—Shrimp and
comparing the disparate actions of the Inter-American
Convention with the efforts by the United States to
negotiate agreements with WTO Members). According to
the author, the element of good faith that was present
in
the
Inter-American
Convention
should
be
the
benchmark for future negotiations, which the U.S.
international negotiations did not measure up to
because the United States failed to take “into account
the situations of the other negotiating countries.” Id.
137. See Sparshott, supra note 6 (stating that Antigua
lacked natural resources, so it "built up its Internet
gambling industry to supplement its tourism-driven
economy" and that licensed casinos retain over 1,300
employees and produce approximately $68 million in
income).
138. See Carmel Sileo, Online Casino Pursues Long-Odds
Lawsuit, TRIAL, May 2005, at 98 (finding that the U.S.
ban on cross-border gambling is very damaging to
Antigua’s economy, which is dependent on the United
States’ business as the world’s largest consumer of
gambling and betting services).
139. See discussion supra Part I.C (discussing that the
Panel and the Appellate Body determined that the IHA is
potentially
discriminating
between
domestic
and
foreign-service suppliers).
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The Appellate Body should have determined
that the U.S. Internet gambling restrictions
represent unjustifiable discrimination.140 Both
the Panels in United States—Gasoline and
United States—Shrimp pointed out that the
express terms of the chapeau in Article XX of
the GATT address the manner of applying the
disputed measure.141 However, the Appellate
Body in Antigua did not follow that same
rationale.142 Although the Appellate Body noted
that there are situations where a statute is
facially neutral, yet the application of the
statute
can
rise
to
the
level
of
discrimination, the Appellate Body discounted
Antigua’s evidence that the U.S. statutes were
applied in a discriminatory manner.143 The
Appellate Body erred when it reversed the
Panel’s
chapeau
analysis
based
on
its
determination that the U.S. Internet gambling
140. See Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra
note 28, ¶ 123 (noting that the exceptions of Article
XX should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat
the legal obligations of the holder of the right under
the substantive rules of the General Agreement).
141. See id. ¶ 118 (citing the Appellate Body in United
States—Gasoline, providing that the nature and quality
of discriminatory application of a measure is different
from the discrimination in the treatment of products
which were already found to be inconsistent with one of
the substantive obligations of the GATT).
142. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.575 (citing
the Appellate Body in United States—Shrimp, stating
that "a balance must be struck between the right of a
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the
duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights
of the other Members").
143. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 352-57
(showing that Antigua presented evidence that foreign
suppliers of Internet gambling were prosecuted under
the Wire Act, but there was a lack of enforcement
against U.S. firms).
Despite Antigua’s evidence, the
Appellate Body determined that it was inconclusive. Id.
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restrictions,
on
their
face,
do
not
discriminate between United States and foreign
suppliers of remote gambling services.
Antigua pointed to four U.S. firms that
supposedly engaged in the remote supply of
gambling services, but despite this violation,
none of these firms were prosecuted under any
of the disputed federal statutes.144 Antigua
then contrasted this lack of law enforcement
with an Antiguan service supplier, prosecuted
and convicted under the Wire Act, despite the
fact that he modeled his business after a U.S.
firm.145 Based on that strong allegation, the
Appellate
Body
should
have
considered
Antigua’s claim that an Internet sports book
service based in Antigua was prosecuted and
convicted under the Wire Act, whereas other
similar U.S. firms had not been prosecuted.146
If that claim were valid, it is likely that
based on previous WTO decisions, this would
constitute
arbitrary
or
unjustifiable
147
Antigua presented evidence
discrimination.

144. See id. ¶ 352 (stating that U.S. firms such as
Youbet.com, TVG, Capital OTB, and Xpressbet.com engage
in the remote supply of gambling services, but have not
been prosecuted under the Wire Act, the Travel Act, or
the IGBA).
145. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.585 (citing
United States v. Jay Cohen, finding that "an operator
of an Internet sports book service based in Antigua was
prosecuted and ultimately convicted under the Wire Act,
even though that operator had modeled his business on
that of Capital OTB, a US company that had been
offering interstate betting" by either telephone or the
Internet for over twenty years without prosecution).
146. See id. ¶¶ 6.588-6.589 (noting that although the
United States claimed that it enforced its prohibition
on the cross-border supply of gambling equally to
foreign and domestic suppliers, the Panel found that
the United States did not provide evidence that it
enforced its prohibitions in a manner consistent with
the chapeau of Article XIV).
147. See id. ¶ 6.585 (noting Antigua’s argument that
the
U.S.
actions
constitute
unjustifiable
discrimination because large-scale Internet operators
in the United States offer betting services via the

FINAL FINAL

2006]

9/28/2006 12:16:26 PM

GAMBLING

ON THE

FUTURE

OF

GATS

141

of
the
United
States’
unjustifiable
discrimination and the United States did not
provide concrete evidence refuting Antigua’s
claims.148 Therefore, the Appellate Body had no
basis for discounting Antigua’s claims.149
The IHA further demonstrates that the United
States enacted an Internet gambling law that
benefited its domestic business.150 In effect,
the IHA allows betting on horse races by phone
or computer, but that right is limited only to
U.S. states where it is legal to place and
accept bets, therefore demonstrating outright
discrimination against foreign companies.151 If
Internet,
but
the
United
States
does
not
take
enforcement action against them).
148. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 352
(indicating that the United States produced evidence of
pending prosecution proceedings against one domestic
remote supplier of Internet gambling, but stated that
it had no evidence as to whether enforcement action was
being taken against the other domestic suppliers
identified by Antigua).
149. See id. ¶ 356 (finding that more persuasive
evidence should have been submitted, such as "evidence
on the overall number of suppliers, and on patterns of
enforcement,
and
on
the
reasons
for
particular
instances of non-enforcement").
150. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.597 (agreeing
with
Antigua
that
the
text
of
the
Interstate
Horseracing Act appears to permit interstate wagering
over the telephone or other modes of electronic
communication, which would presumably include the
Internet, as long as such wagering is legal in both
states). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 4 (stating that the 2000 amendments to the
Interstate Horseracing Act expanded the definition of
interstate off-track wagering to include the Internet).
151. See Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games
People Play: Is it Time for a New Legal Approach to
Prize Games?, 4 NEV. L.J. 197, 210 (2003) (noting that
the Interstate Horseracing Act “applies to wagers
placed in one state on the outcome of races held in
another state”). It is up to the discretion of state
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the United States wanted to continue to ban
Internet gambling in the name of protecting
public
morals
by
restricting
foreign
operators, it would have to block all remote
gambling, something that is unlikely given the
popularity of interstate horseracing gambling,
made legal under the IHA.152 Although the
United States has the right to enact laws to
protect its residents from the “dangers” of
gambling, it cannot unjustifiably discriminate
against foreigners to protect its local
businesses.153
The discriminatory nature of the IHA is
clear evidence that the United States has laws
that
are
more
favorable
to
domestic
businesses,
at
the
expense
of
foreign
companies.154 If the Panel and the Appellate
Body agreed that the IHA is unjustifiably
discriminatory, it is not only a clear

racing or gaming officials to monitor other aspects of
horseracing, such as licensing and policing. Id.
152. See Kurt Eichenwald, At PartyGaming, Everything’s
Wild, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at 31 (arguing that
although American federal statutes state that providing
online gambling is illegal, London-based businesses
such as PartyPoker.com continue to operate without
government intervention). In 2004, the company amassed
$600 million in revenue and $350 million in profit,
with almost ninety percent coming from American
gamblers. Id.
153. See
generally
Peter
M.
Gerhart,
The
Two
Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization,
24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 15 (2003) (stating that
there
are
two
fundamental
principles
of
nondiscrimination that underlie the WTO system). The
National Treatment principle states that “no foreign
business should be treated less favorably than a
domestic business.” Id.
154. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 372
(finding that based on the implementation of the
Interstate Horseracing Act, the United States did not
satisfy the chapeau requirements of Article XIV because
the United States did not demonstrate that the
prohibitions embodied in the Interstate Horseracing Act
are applied equally “to both foreign and domestic
service suppliers of remote betting services for
horseracing”).
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indication that the U.S. measures rise to the
level
of
“arbitrary”
or
“unjustifiable”
discrimination, but it also undermines the
main U.S. argument that its goal is to protect
public morals from the dangers of remote
gambling. Bets involving horse racing are
still gambling activities and the “moral”
implications associated with them are not
inherently distinct from other forms of
gambling.
Rather than finding that the United States
did not meet the standards specified in the
chapeau of Article XIV, the Appellate Body
ruled that if the United States alters the
IHA, so that it is not discriminatory toward
foreign companies, the United States will be
in
compliance
with
its
WTO
treaty
155
Both the Panels in United
obligations.
States—Gasoline
and
United
States—Shrimp
interpreted the chapeau of Article XX as an
expression of the principle of good faith,
which is a general principal of international
law and also controls the exercise of rights
by States.156 The discriminatory nature of the
IHA, combined with the U.S. failure to engage
in negotiations with Antigua and its disregard
for the impact of the statutes, demonstrate
155. See I. Nelson Rose, Internet Gaming: U.S. Beats
Antigua in WTO, CASINO CITY TIMES (May 22, 2005),
http://rose.casinocitytimes.com/articles/19020.html
(noting that Congress will likely amend the Interstate
Horseracing Act to permit Americans to wager on foreign
races and additionally, to permit foreign bettors to
gamble on American races). Once that amendment is made,
the United States could continue to prohibit both
foreign and domestic Internet gambling. Id.
156. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1-B.2 (noting that
the Appellate Body in both cases determined that the
United States failed to make a good faith effort in
reaching an agreement with the disputing parties).
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that the United States was not acting in good
faith; thus the Appellate Body erred when it
determined that the United States met the
requirements under the chapeau of Article XIV.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The WTO Appellate Body should have found
that the U.S. Internet gambling restrictions
violated the provisions of the GATS and that
these restrictions did not qualify for an
exception under Article XIV. The Appellate
Body’s decision was flawed for three main
reasons: its interpretation did not adhere to
the textual language of Article XIV and
footnote 5, its analysis unduly expanded the
definition
of
necessary,
and
it
was
inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIV.
Inevitably, the WTO will face similar problems
and inconsistencies in its Appellate Body
rulings unless the WTO further addresses the
binding nature of previous Panel and Appellate
Body reports in its Dispute Settlement system.
Other alternatives for resolving inconsistent
decisions include making the language of the
GATS more precise or having the Appellate Body
make efforts to strictly adhere to the textual
language.
Further,
because
the
Internet
gambling industry is rapidly growing in size
and revenue,157 the parties in this case should
consider looking at other countries’ decisions
to
regulate
Internet
gambling
and
the
potential
benefits
of
international
regulation.
157. See Louise Kong et al., New Media, Regulations and
Policies
on
Online
Gambling,
http://newmedia.cityu.edu.hk/cyberlaw/gp25/intro.html
(last visited May 3, 2006) (noting that "gambling has
become one of the fastest growing businesses on the
Internet" and "it is expected that the revenue
generated by Internet gambling will have further
substantial growth in the years ahead"). Currently,
there are more than 2,500 online gambling sites and the
revenue brought in by these sites in 2006 "is nearly
six times that of 1999." Id.
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A. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM SHOULD FURTHER
ADDRESS THE BINDING NATURE OF PREVIOUS DECISIONS
Currently, the WTO has a system of de facto
stare decisis, but it should further address
the binding nature of previous Panel and
Appellate
Body
decisions,
in
order
to
eliminate
inconsistent
Appellate
Body
decisions.158 The idea of stare decisis is
already prevalent in Appellate Body reports,
which indicates that the current WTO dispute
system already acknowledges that previous
decisions have a “binding nature” and have
significant precedential value.159 However, the
WTO needs to address the extent to which past
decisions are binding. If the Appellate Body
is explicitly bound by the reasoning used in
past decisions, the WTO will benefit from a
Dispute Settlement system that is fair,
predictable, and credible.160 Besides offering

158. See Jose Felgueroso, TRIPS and the Dispute
Settlement Understanding: The First Six Years, 30 AIPLA
Q.J. 165, 223-24 (2002) (distinguishing between de jure
and de facto stare decisis by arguing that de facto
stare decisis depends on quasi-legal factors such as
the tribunal's tendencies, the tribunal’s concept of
justice, or the tribunal's need for consistency and
uniformity).
159. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶
291 (noting that both the Panel and the Appellate Body
recognized the textual similarities between Article XIV
of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT and found
previous interpretations of Article XX relevant in its
analysis of Article XIV).
160. See
Allen
Z.
Hertz,
Shaping
the
Trident:
Intellectual
Property
Under
NAFTA,
Investment
Protection
Agreements
and
at
the
World
Trade
Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 280 (1997) (noting
that although the WTO has not formally adopted stare
decisis, the way in which the panels interpret the
TRIPS Agreement will more specifically determine the
TRIPS obligations of WTO Members). But see Dale Arthur
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stability and certainty, a system of binding
precedent would also level the playing field
between first and third world countries, as
well as create legitimacy in Appellate Body
decisions.161
If there is no formal legal obligation for
the
Appellate
Body
to
follow
its
own
decisions, there is a risk that, as in the
United States—Antigua dispute, the Appellate
Body will depart from or expand upon previous
decisions without sufficient justification.162
Here, the Appellate Body deviated from its
past decisions, but because its decision is
the final step in the WTO dispute settlement
process and it has no legal obligation to
adhere to its past decisions, Antigua has to
suffer for the Appellate Body’s deviation.
Formally addressing the binding nature of
previous
decisions
would
legitimize
the
system, serve as a check on its decisions, and
ensure that the Appellate Body adequately
Oesterle, The WTO Reaches Out to the Environmentalists:
Is it Too Little, Too Late?, 1999 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 1, 18 (2000) (arguing against developing WTO
case law and precedent in protectionist trade barriers
disputes because panels do not have the political
authority or expertise to carry out that role). When
there is a complicated case concerning international
trade agreements, member governments should negotiate
and come to a consensus, rather than have the WTO
panels look to case law to make a decision. Id. at 19.
161. See Theodore R. Posner & Timothy M. Reif, Homage
to a Bull Moose: Applying Lessons of History to Meet
the Challenges of Globalization, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
481, 503 (2000) (noting that a trade imbalance exists
between larger and smaller trading countries because
smaller countries rely on market access to larger
countries). Because of this trade imbalance, larger
trading countries are able to shape global trade rules.
Id.
162. See Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De
Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a
Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 900 (2001)
(arguing that stare decisis serves as "a shield against
judicial activism, or worse yet, judicial tyranny"). In
order to avoid arbitrary discretion, courts should
conform to strict rules. Id.
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interprets
and
applies
the
law.163
The
Appellate Body’s final report binds the
parties unless there is a consensus of WTO
Members against the report.164 The adoption of
stare decisis would also reduce tension
between first and third world countries
because first world countries would not be
able to use their political or economic power
to influence the outcome of a dispute.165

B. WTO MEMBERS SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING
LANGUAGE OF THE GATS MORE PRECISE

THE

The Members of the WTO should consider
amending the language of Article XIV of the
GATS
to
explicitly
define
the
term
166
“necessary.”
General
exceptions
to
a
Member’s obligations under GATS are raised
under Article XIV, which requires that the
exception be “necessary to protect public
morals or maintain public order,” “necessary
163. See id. at 903 (noting that stare decisis
increases legitimacy when it increases the probability
that similar cases will be treated in an equal manner,
which is an important concept of justice).
164. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The
World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 531-32
(2000) (noting that the consensus requirement assures
the automatic adoption of final reports because of the
assumption that the winning party will be “unwilling to
join any consensus against a ruling in its favor”).
165. See id. at 907-08 (arguing that the WTO system is
successful if it aids in the trade development of
poorer countries and one way this can be accomplished
is if all WTO Members knew that developed countries
were bound to international law by prior holdings).
166. See discussion supra Part I.B.3 (explaining that
the Appellate Body in Korea—Beef set a stricter
standard of necessity, but the decision does not
explain its reasoning for setting the stricter standard
nor does it explain if that was the meaning intended by
the WTO Members).
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to protect human, animal or plant life or
health,” or “necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent
with
provisions
of
[the]
agreement.”167 All of the general exceptions
originate from the term “necessary,” making it
essential to more precisely define the term.168
If looking to past decisions, prior rulings
determining “necessary” under Article XX of
the GATT do not adequately define the term to
such a point of clarity where there is no
confusion.169 Similar to the international
standards
established
in
the
Technical
Barriers to Trade (“TBT”), WTO Members should
commonly determine a world standard for
“necessary,” rather than having each Member
establish its own discretionary definition of
what measures are “necessary.”170

C. A REGULATYORY REGIME FOR REMOTE GAMBLING
WOULD BETTER ACCOUNT FOR THE UNIQUE NATURE
OF REGULATING INTERNET ACTIVITY

167. GATS, supra note 20, art. XIV.
168. Cf. Reif & Eckert, supra note 50, at 679 (agreeing
that the language of Article III of the GATT is vague,
which
allowed
the
Appellate
Body
to
exercise
significant discretion in developing interpretations of
this provision).
169. See id. at 708 (pointing to flaws in the Appellate
Body’s decision in the Beef Hormone case because the
Appellate Body never gave support for the fundamental
conclusion on which the rest of its analysis is based).
This raises the issue of the level of discretion used
by
the
Appellate
Body
when
it
interprets
key
provisions. Id.
170. See World Trade Organization, Technical Barriers
to Trade: Technical Explanation, Technical Information
on
Technical
Barriers
to
Trade,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.ht
m (last visited May 3, 2006) (determining that
harmonization
is
an
important
aspect
of
nondiscrimination and national treatment, so the TBT
Agreement
encourages
Members
to
participate
in
international
bodies
to
provide
standards
for
conformity assessment procedures).
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The
jurisdictional
and
technological
complexity in regulating Internet activities
warrants
consideration
of
other
viable
171
solutions beyond mere prohibition.
Because
of the vast amount of revenue generated by
online gambling and because the nature of the
Internet mandates that any regulatory or
prohibitory schema be constructed in the
international arena, a regulatory regime for
Internet gambling should be considered.172
Several countries have successfully moved
toward Internet gambling regulations, such as
Britain, Australia, and Belgium, all of which
passed
new
legislation
regulating
online
For
example,
Britain’s
new
gambling.173
legislation establishes a new commission, as
well as a body of investigators, to regulate
the gambling industry, thus enabling online
casinos to operate from Britain for the first
time.174

171. See generally Roger Clarke & Gillian Dempsey, The
Technical Feasibility of Regulating Gambling on the
Internet, at 6-7 (Conf. on Gambling, Tech. & Soc’y:
Regulatory Challenges for the 21st Century, Working
Paper,
May
1998),
available
at
http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/gambling/dempseyclarke.pdf
(reviewing
the
emergence
and
nuances
associated with internet gambling).
172. See Andrle, supra note 5, at 1391-92 (noting the
global nature of online gambling).
173. See
Javad
Heydary,
Advertising
for
Online
Gambling–Is it Legal?, E-COMMERCE TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005,
available
at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/42696.html
(last
visited August 26, 2006) (advocating a pro-Internet
regulation position in light of the nonenforcement of
Internet gambling laws and remote gambling’s legality
in several countries).
174. See id.
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Currently, there is confusion because every
country has its own policy on what types of
Internet gambling it allows and whether its
inhabitants can have legal access to Internet
gambling. States should be encouraged to grant
a limited amount of gambling licenses, which
would allow countries that are worried about
the effects of gambling on public morals, such
as the United States, to monitor the amount of
gambling and impose technical safeguards on
Internet gambling providers.175
The rise in popularity of Internet gambling
makes prohibition an ineffective solution,
while a regulatory licensing scheme would be
an economically beneficial solution.176 Forcing
online casinos to comply with strict licensing
requirements would help to legitimize the
virtual
casinos
that
are
abiding
by
international rules and also, fees from these
licensing requirements could be used to
monitor
these
Internet
gambling
sites.177
Additionally, operators and Internet gambling
sites will be more reputable if they are

175. See Jenna F. Karadbil, Note, Casinos of the Next
Millennium: A Look Into the Proposed Ban on Internet
Gambling, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 444-45 (2000)
(arguing that the United States could benefit from
strict licensing regulations because licensing fees
will enable the United States to monitor and legitimize
Internet gambling sites).
176. See Andrle, supra note 5, at 1407 (arguing that
prohibition plan may exacerbate the problem of Internet
gambling in the United States because "domestic laws
that
prohibit
Internet
gambling
may
discourage
respected U.S. casino operators from entering the
online casino market"); see also Joseph M. Kelly,
Internet Gambling Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 117, 171
(2000) (arguing that a regulatory proposal by the North
American Gaming Regulators Association calls for a new
commission composed of individuals with an expertise in
Internet gambling).
177. See Karadbil, supra note 175 at 444; see also Kong
et al., supra note 157 (noting that the loss of tax
revenue in many countries has forced other governments
to re-examine their stance towards regulating Internet
gambling).
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forced to comply with licensing requirements,
which could include paying operating fees or
subjecting
to
personal
and
credit
178
investigations.

CONCLUSION
The Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA
do not meet the requirements for an exception
under Article XIV of the GATS, and the
Appellate Body therefore erred when it found
that these restrictions are necessary to
protect public morals or maintain public
order. In finding that the United States’
restrictions on Internet gambling qualified
for an exception under Article XIV of the
GATS, the Appellate Body failed to adequately
balance international free trade rules with
the United States’ desire to continue to
enforce
federal
restrictions
relating
to
Internet gambling. In its decision, the
Appellate Body failed to adhere to previous
WTO
decisions
dealing
with
similar
jurisprudence, failed to adhere to the text of
Article
XIV,
and
failed
to
uphold
the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV.
In order to resolve future problems and
inconsistencies in its Appellate Body rulings,
the WTO should further address the binding
nature of previous decisions in its Dispute
178. See Andrle, supra note 5, at 1406-08 (arguing that
a strong regulatory system may adequately resolve some
of the societal concerns revolving around online
gambling because "specialized technology such as datatracking
systems
that
monitor
Internet
casino
transactions make spotting and screening out compulsive
gamblers
easier
than
land-based
casinos").
Additionally, electronic records can be saved, making
it
easier
to
identify
addictive
and
compulsive
behavior. Id.
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Settlement System. Otherwise, WTO Members
should consider making the language in Article
XIV of the GATS more precise. Alternatively,
because of the growth and nature of the
Internet gambling industry, the WTO should
recommend that future parties develop a more
permanent
solution,
such
as
a
scheme
regulating Internet gambling.

